The Works of Niccolò Machiavelli :: The Historical, Political, and Diplomatic Writings of Niccolò Machiavelli, vol. 2: The Prince, Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius, Thoughts of a Statesman :: Frontmatter

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The Historical, Political, and Diplomatic Writings of Niccolò Machiavelli, vol. 2: The Prince, Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius, Thoughts of a Statesman

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discourses on the first ten books of titus livius.

niccolo machiavelli to zanobi buondelmonte and cosimo rucellai, greeting.

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chapter I.: the greatness of the romans was due more to their valor and ability than to good fortune.

chapter II.: what nations the romans had to contend against, and with what obstinacy they defended their liberty.

chapter III.: rome became great by ruining her neighboring cities, and by freely admitting strangers to her privileges and honors.

chapter IV.: the ancient republics employed three different methods for aggrandizing themselves.

chapter V.: the changes of religion and of languages, together with the occurrence of deluges and pestilences, destroy the record of things.

chapter VI.: of the manner in which the romans conducted their wars.

chapter VII.: how much land the romans allowed to each colonist.

chapter VIII.: the reasons why people leave their own country to spread over others.

chapter IX.: what the causes are that most frequently provoke war between sovereigns.

chapter X.: money is not the sinews of war, although it is generally so considered.

chapter XI.: it is not wise to form an alliance with a prince that has more reputation than power.

chapter XII.: whether it is better, when apprehending an attack, to await it at home, or to carry the war into the enemy’s country.

chapter XIII.: cunning and deceit will serve a man better than force to rise from a base condition to great fortune.

chapter XIV.: men often deceive themselves in believing that by humility they can overcome insolence.

chapter XV.: feeble states are always undecided in their resolves; and slow resolves are invariably injurious.

chapter XVI.: wherein the military system differs from that of the ancients.

chapter XVII.: of the value of artillery to modern armies, and whether the general opinion respecting it is correct.

chapter XVIII.: according to the authority of the romans and the example of ancient armies we should value infantry more than cavalry.

chapter XIX.: conquests made by republics that are not well constituted, and do not follow in their conduct the example of the romans, are more conducive to their ruin than to their advancement.

chapter XX.: of the dangers to which princes and republics are exposed that employ auxiliary or mercenary troops.

chapter XXI.: the first prætor sent by the romans anywhere was to capua, four hundred years after they began to make war upon that city.

chapter XXII.: how often the judgments of men in important matters are erroneous.

chapter XXIII.: how much the romans avoided half-way measures when they had to decide upon the fate of their subjects.

chapter XXIV.: fortresses are generally more injurious than useful.

chapter XXV.: it is an error to take advantage of the internal dissensions of a city, and to attempt to take possession of it whilst in that condition.

chapter XXVI.: contempt and insults engender hatred against those who indulge in them, without being of any advantage to them.

chapter XXVII.: wise princes and republics should content themselves with victory; for when they aim at more, they generally lose.

chapter XXVIII.: how dangerous it is for a republic or a prince not to avenge a public or a private injury.

chapter XXIX.: fortune blinds the minds of men when she does not wish them to oppose her designs.

chapter XXX.: republics and princes that are really powerful do not purchase alliances by money, but by their valor and the reputation of their armies.

chapter XXXI.: how dangerous it is to trust to the representations of exiles.

chapter XXXII.: of the method practised by the romans in taking cities.

chapter XXXIII.: the romans left the commanders of their armies entirely uncontrolled in their operations.

thoughts of a statesman.

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The Works of Niccolò Machiavelli

The Historical, Political, and Diplomatic Writings of Niccolò Machiavelli, vol. 2: The Prince, Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius, Thoughts of a Statesman

Frontmatter

ISBN Number: 978-1-57085-147-6

Charlottesville, Virginia, USA: InteLex Corporation, 2017

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Frontmatter

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LORENZO DE MEDICI From the portrait by Giorgio Vasari in the Uffici Gallery Florence
Heliog Durjardin Paris

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THE HISTORICAL, POLITICAL, AND DIPLOMATIC WRITINGS of
NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI
TRANSLATED FROM THE ITALIAN
by
CHRISTIAN E. DETMOLD
in four volumes
Vol. II.
BOSTON
JAMES R. OSGOOD AND COMPANY
1882

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Copyright, 1882, By Christian E. Detmold.

All rights reserved.

University Press: John Wilson and Son, Cambridge.

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CONTENTS OF VOLUME II.

THE PRINCE	Page 1
DISCOURSES ON THE FIRST TEN BOOKS OF TITUS LIVIUS.
First Book	93
Second Book	223
Third Book	319
THOUGHTS OF A STATESMAN	433

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Frontmatter